Multipliying Obstetrics. Techniques of surveillance and forms of coordination by Akrich, Madeleine & Pasveer, Bernike
Multipliying Obstetrics. Techniques of surveillance and
forms of coordination
Madeleine Akrich, Bernike Pasveer
To cite this version:
Madeleine Akrich, Bernike Pasveer. Multipliying Obstetrics. Techniques of surveillance and
forms of coordination. Theoretical Medecine, 2000, pp.63-83. <halshs-00082067>
HAL Id: halshs-00082067
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00082067
Submitted on 26 Jun 2006
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Multiplying Obstetrics
Techniques of Surveillance and Forms of Coordination
Madeleine Akrich and Bernike Pasveer1
Theoretical Medecine, n°21, pp.63-83.
1. Introduction
In his book Power and the Profession of Obstetrics,2 Arney has developed a general
model of modern obstetrics, based upon a careful analysis of theories, practices and
debates in this discipline. In this model, the notion of ‘surveillance’ is put center stage.
Arney argues that throughout a series of technical innovations like fetal monitoring
and ultrasound, the fetus has been constituted as a patient for the obstetrician who
henceforth gained authority upon the other actors involved in the process, i.e.
midwives and parents. Resulting from this move, the exclusive relationships
between woman and midwife, which characterized the traditional organisation of
care, have been replaced by a triangular relationship, associating obstetrician,
parents and fetus.3
According to Arney, these technical innovations have had other impacts as
well. First, they have modified the nature of surveillance. Pregnancy and childbirth
are medically redefined as a process which needs continuous surveillance or
monitoring. The frontiers between normal and abnormal on which obstetrics has
been based, have thus become blurred. Secondly, drawing on a foucauldian analysis,
Arney argues that through the objectivation they produce, monitoring techniques
function as a sort of panoptique, in which individual and collective work is rendered
                                                
1 Madeleine Akrich is researcher at the Centre de Sociologie de l’Innovation of the Ecole Nationale
Superieure des Mines in Paris. Bernike Pasveer is assistent professor at the Faculty of Arts and
Culture of the University Maastricht. We thank our respective and shared collegues for their
constructive and stimulating investments in our work, the editors of this issue, Dick Willems and
Rein Vos for their comments on this article, and the people who have provided us with or acted as
our ‘data’ for their contribution.
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London: Harvard University Press; Ploeg, I. van der (1998),     Prosthetic Bodies. Female Embodiment
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visible for the professionals themselves. Surveillance and control do not only concern
the baby-to-be and its mother, but are also excerted over professionals: they too
require and impose a new form of discipline amongst them which puts them under
the gaze of non-professionals, parents, lawyers and prosecutors. Obstetricians’
apparent autonomy and authority are thus challenged by the very settings they
emerged from.
On numerous aspects, Arney’s analysis is convincing and appropriate. More
or less implicit, however, is the idea that the trend of increasing surveillance of those
who take part in modern obstetrics, is in a way inescapable - that this is modern
obstetrics. Moreover, in Arney’s version of modern obstetrics, the role of the
technologies that produce this regime of surveillance, is quite ambiguous.
‘Monitoring’ is both a technical device used intermittently during pregnancy and
continuously during birth, and an obstetrical ‘paradigm’ which defines medical
practices as well as relations between various actors. Without monitoring devices,
the monitoring paradigm would not have developed, as the devices organise and
allow for coordination of the actors. However, it remains somewhat unclear what
the exact role of the monitoring device in/and the paradigm are. In this paper, we
will try to modify Arney’s quite static image of modern obstetrics, try to render
more detailed the roles of technologies of surveillance, and investigate the
emergence of participants to the process of pregnancy and birth. We argue that
rather than taking for granted that Obstetrics as a system of knowledge ‘influences’
or ‘is’ obstetrical practice, one might try to study the chains of devices, techniques,
procedures, through which passages are constituted that may go all the way from
obstetrics to Obstetrics, and/or vice versa.
Three questions will be treated in relation to Arney’s model of obstetrics: 1) is
it adequate to speak of only one model of modern obstetrics? 2) how is the fetus
constituted in Dutch practices of ‘modern obstetrics’, and (how) does its eventual
emergence modify relationships between parents and professionals? 3) how might
we understand the role and place of monitoring technologies in obstetrics?
In a first part we will focus on the general organisation of Dutch and French
obstetrics.4 Drawing upon an analysis of recent controversies, we will show that
while ‘surveillance’ can indeed be used to characterize both systems, practical
solutions adopted to ensure this surveillance differ widely from one country to
another, but also between practices within one obstetrical system. These different
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scales of differences produce quite a variation of ways of defining pregnancy, birth,
and obstetrical work, and they are linked to contrasted ways of attributing
competencies and ‘power’ to initiate or perform activities to the main obstetrical
professionals, i.e. midwives and obstetricians.
In a second part, we will concentrate on Dutch practices of attending
pregnancy. We argue that whereas they all relate to the general organisation of
Dutch obstetrics, they render those who partake in the process and their relations
present in rather different ways: fetuses do enter relationships, but not quite or
always in the way described by Arney.
This leads to our final argument on the ways technologies of
surveillance/monitoring participate in the definition of these settings. We use data of
French obstetrics to make our point here.5
In concluding, we will return to Arney’s obstetrics on the one hand, and to
ours on the other. We argue that as obstetrical practices are less static and
monolythic than we might think on the basis of Arney’s analysis, and that this
dynamic allows for interesting experiments within and between obstetrical practices
and organizations.
2. Politics of Surveillance
At first glance, French obstetrical practices quite resemble American ones. Nearly all
births occur in hospitals or clinics in a highly medicalized and technological
environment. Infusion and monitoring are systematically used, while epidural,
forceps and vacuum are increasingly present and used in the birthing room. During
pregnancy too, medical technologies are rather present. At least three ultrasound
examinations are performed and blood sampling takes place almost every month.
By contrast, The Netherlands often are perceived as a country in which women can
give birth “naturally ”, that is: according to laws of nature, or simply in a non-
technological manner. Of course, this Nature is a highly civilized and reconstructed
one. Still, some 54% of all births occur under the exclusive surveillance of a midwife6
who can use only very few instruments. About two third of these “non-medicalised”
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births take place at home. The remaining third take place with the midwife in a
hospital, the woman leaving the hospital within some 24 hours after her arrival.7
Performance measured in terms of fetal and maternal morbidity and mortality are
comparable in the two countries, and even a bit in favor of the Netherlands.8
Recently, there has been a massive governmental effort to try to reorganize
French perinatal care. At the beginning of the 1990s, the government asked a
commission (Haut Comité à la Santé Publique) to prepare a report and to make
propositions in order to improve the quality and safety of childbirth. This report had
been prepared by a series of epidemiological surveys. It leads to the conclusion that
French obstetrical performances are poorer than was usually thought and than in
other European countries. One of these surveys described cases of maternal deaths
and concluded that in two cases out of three, death had been avoidable and that it
was caused by a delay in the diagnostic process, or by a delay in the realization of
proper treatment. For the experts, the relatively high percentage of avoidable deaths
could be explained by the exceptional character of the pathologies manifested, which
implied a high chance of meeting with poorly expertised practitioners. In practice,
this argument was reinforced by the fact that midwives are often the only ones in
charge of the diagnosis (for in some maternities the obstetrician is not present 24
hours a day).
The committee drew a parallel between this result and the description of
human and technical resources in obstetric wards. They concluded that human and
technical resources were lacking in most maternities, in particular in small ones. They
thus make safety appear as a quality attributed to places which are then
characterised by the amount of resources that can be drawn upon. According to this
analysis, a woman whose pregnancy has been absolutely normal is not safe if she
gives birth in a small maternity, where  neonatologists, anesthesists, obstetricians are
not present 24 hours a day (even if they can be called from home 24 hours a day,
which is always the case). Besides the connectedness of safety and place, the
committee also made an argument to relate safety with the size of hospitals or
clinics: the bigger a hospital, the better equipped it would be and the more safety it
would be able to provide.
The report concluded on the necessity to reduce the number of hospitals, thus
allowing for a better allocation of existing resources: in short, it opted for a small
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number of large and well equipped hospitals, and for closing down maternities with
less than 300 births a year (which represent one sixth of the total number of French
maternities). Not surprisingly, people working in these small hospitals did not agree.
Their argument9 denunciates economic motives underlying medical reasoning, and
tries to show that whatever is the problem - economic or medical - closing the small
hospitals could never be an appropriate solution. In particular, they contest the
report’s definition of competencies as framed by the parameters of size and
place/resource. They argue that, in case of problems, it is probably safer to be taken
in charge within 10-15 minutes by an experienced obstetrician, like the ones who
usually run small maternities, than by one of the advanced medical students who
ensure the permanent presence of “physicians” in large hospitals. Here, the
discussion doesn’t concern the evaluation of risks, but the nature of necessary high-
level competencies, given the assumption that risks do exist, while their actual
occurrance cannot be foreseen.
We will not enter further into the description of controversies here. Instead,
we want to point to something that remains unquestioned by every participant to
these controversies. The great majority of French obstetricians agree that as
‘obstetrics is an emergency speciality, births cannot be scheduled and obstetrical
complications even less.’10Any childbirth is a risk and pathology can occur at any
moment in any case; birth ‘can be said to be normal only two hours after the
delivery.’11 For this reason, safety can only be properly ensured by having all births
occur in a place where human and technical resources are available at any time.
Thus, birth is not considered as pathological as such and by definition. Rather,
as Arney also points out for the United States, any frontier between normality and
pathology is definitely blurred. It is this blurring which subsequenly implies a high
degree of continuous and medicalized surveillance of all pregnancies and births, for
after all, one cannot foretell what will happen and one must thus always be prepared
for the worst.
Dutch controversies do not concern the allocation of resources to different places,
but the allocation of women to different professionals, and the attribution of power
about the decisions to be made in this respect. Controversies center around a central
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device, the VIL (Verloskundige Indicatie Lijst/List of Obstetrical Indications) which
plays a major coordinating role during each woman’s pregnancy and each child’s
birth. This VIL is a list of pathologies and factors that have to be taken into account
while surveilling pregnancy and birth. Some of these may pre-exist pregnancy
(diabetes, psychological problems etc.). Others are linked to a woman’s obstetrical
past (previous caesarian section for example). Still others may present themselves
during pregnancy or birth (aenemia, twins, a gestation of more than 42 weeks, fetal
distress). Obstetrical indications are grouped into three categories: A, B, C. Women
suffering from no pathology or (risk of) A-pathology will be looked after all during
pregnancy and birth by midwives working in private practice. They may choose to
give birth at home or “poliklinisch”. In all cases, they will be accompanied by their
midwife and will not meet with other technical devices than a fetal stetoscope, a
doppler, a centimeter, scissors to make an episiotomy if necessary.12 No apparatus is
present that guarantees a continuous registration of the process. The surveillance of
women with a (risk of) C-pathology will necessarily be ensured in hospitals, by
obstetricians, and birth will occur in conditions similar to hospital births in other
western countries.13 A (risk of) B-pathology (suspicion of twins, of retarded fetal
growth, uncertainly of the gestation period, high blood pressure) require that the
surveilling midwife refers the woman and/or her dossier to an obstetrician or
another specialist in order to get a second opinion or a precise diagnosis. Formally,
the midwife then decides about the further allocation of the surveillance of her client:
with her, or with the obstetrician.
Dutch controversies often draw upon the VIL. Some of them concern the
classification of a factor or a pathology. For example, midwives are contesting the
fact that being over 35 when pregnant for the first time or being pregnant thanks to
IVF, must to be considered C-risks. Some midwives also contest the idea that a risk
factor concerning only the delivery, like a previous caesarian section, should affect all
pregnancy care. Finally, some controversies concern the allocation of the power of
decision-making: must the midwife always decide upon the allocation and further
trajectory of a woman with a B-pathology, or should that power be allocated to the
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obstetrician to whom a woman is referred? Obstetricians argue that, as they are the
ones who have access to diagnostic instruments, their expertise necessarily
encompasses the entire process from collection of clinical and biological evidences to
diagnosis and decision about a woman’s orientation. Midwives consider that to be in
charge of that decision is a necessary condition for the functioning of the Dutch
organisation, for their professional identity is partly built upon a definition of their
specific competencies to avoid medicalization whenever possible. They assume that
to hand over to obstetricians the power to decide would result quite rapidly in
transfering a more significant proportion of women to the hospital system of care.
Describing Dutch controversies, a rather different picture emerges than in the
French case. Safety results from the realization of a proper correspondance between
an individual woman, a kind of surveillance and a specific place and professional at
birth. The reasoning is symmetrical: a woman who is not presenting any pathology
is supposed to be safer at home than in a medicalized setting, with a midwife than
with an obstetrician, whereas a woman presenting a high risk or/of pathology must
not give birth anywhere else than in hospital and with an obstetrician. As we have
seen, the woman’s orientation is realized through the use of the VIL, which functions
as a very powerful coordinating device. The possibility of coordination between
midwives and obstetricians relies upon the assumption that it is always possible to
draw a (temporal or lasting) line between pathology and physiology. This is not to
say that frontiers between normality and pathology are clearcut and defined once
and forever. It is assumed that the normal and the pathological and a frontier
between them can be separated in practice; this drawing of a frontier is at once
‘expected’ and experimental, for it is assumed that according to an individual
woman’s trajectory and body, it performs itself in specific and random manners,
times, locations. So rather than having blurred any frontier between the normal and
the pathological, a series of events have been defined that may occur, any
combination of which might then lead to setting up a frontier and making a singular
match between woman, professional, leval of care, and location.
The Dutch case thus provides us with quite another ‘paradigm of surveillance’ than
the one described and assumed by Arney to be modern obstetrics. The easy way out
of this would of course be to claim that Dutch obstetrics has nothing to do with
modern obstetrics as the specifics of the Dutch organisation render its practices old-
fashioned - but as most other interested parties we will not take the easy way. The
machines characterizing modernity are not absent - rather they are kept at a distance
and moved to the fore once other technologies of surveillance have indicated the
necessity of their use. The Dutch model insists upon the physiological nature of
pregnancy and birth and the necessity to preserve physiology as long as possible: to
use as many parameters as can be imagined to continue framing a birth as ‘normal’
and separating it from the regime of the pathological. Normality, however, is not
organized through the apparatus that have already reconfigured modern obstetrics
according to Arney. Practices of surveillance are not aimed at (technological)
monitoring in order to control a process which is permanently at high risk. Rather,
we see a continuous performance of a frontier between physiology and pathology
and a lasting effort to ascertain the normality of the process.
Modern obstetrics is thus certainly not ‘one’ but more. Its variants cannot be
simply characterized by the way they define pregnancy and birth - they need to be
specified by their framings and associations, through which one or more definitions
of ‘normal’ pregnancy and birth appear, in which the relevant participants and their
powers and competencies are defined and related, and in which various forms and
technologies of coordination and surveillance are used and inventively linked. These
definitions and associations, moreover, are not completely rigid and fixed in the
French case, just as they are not completely random in the Dutch. Rather than
arguing about the natures of pregnancy and birth here, we’d like to argue that ways
of going about pathology and physiology in each setting frame frontiers, their
insides and outsides, and effectuate the presence of those who participate in the
process, and their respective characters, roles, associations, forms of coordination
and constructions of (dis)continuity.
Before investigating how technologies of surveillance work to render variable and
productive the forms, organisations and participants of  modern obstetrics as well as
the coordiantion between them, we will now analyse Arney’s claim as to the
entrance of the fetus as a third relational entity during pregnancy and birth. We want
to show that ‘modern’ obstetrics knows no one fetus but as many fetuses as there
are obstetrical practices. The practices we describe are collusive with and
performative of modern (Dutch) obstetrics, and their constructions of the fetus as
present and relational, or as relatively absent and passive, are therefore informative
of the ways obstetrics and its participants can exist.
Fetuses14
                                                
14 We proceed here on the basis of observations one of us did in some (3) Dutch midwifery practices.
Consultations hours of midwives and their clients have been observed, interviews have been done
with the midwives concerned, and some (between 3 and 5) of their clients have been interviewed
about their experiences. Of course, in any quantitative sense such amounts do not allow for any
generalizations about ‘dutch obstetrics’ - yet their variety alone allows for our claim that practices
of obstetrics exist that simulteneously differ from one another     and    collude with the general
organisation of Obstetrics. Moreover, they are productive of that very organisation as well as of the
articulation of hopes we might have of moving specific practices elsewhere.
As we have already suggested, a certain variability exists of obstetrical practices - not
only between countries but within them as well. Every professional plays with what
are assumed to be the general characteristics of the organisation in which s/he
partakes. At the same time s/he performs a definition of these general features that
allows them to ‘work’ in practice and that allows practice to ‘work’ upon general
obstetrics. Thus, professionals perform personal yet not subjective, random or
idiosynchratic ways of relating a client to obstetrics, of inducing specific definitions
and distributions of obstetrical knowledge, of positioning oneself and one’s client
towards the system of obstetrics within which pregnancy and birth are managed.
This variety of ‘doing’ obstetrics becomes especially clear in the ways midwives or
obstetricians manage consultations in prenatal care. We will follow two Dutch
midwives in order to understand, in a general sense, how the specifics of their
practices perform a kind of obstetrical politics, and to understand how the
organisation of a private practice is constitutive of the presence of the participants.
The first midwife has a small solo-practice in the countryside. The consultation
room is like a normal office, but with an examination table covered with a white
sheet in the corner, and a pair of scales next to the midwife’s desk. During each
consultation of some 20 minutes, the midwife checks her client’s urine, blood
pressure, sometimes she checks blood for signs of aenemia, weight, the growth of
the belly/uterus with her hands and with a centimeter. Midwife and woman listen to
the fetal heart with a doppler. Depending on what the woman says or asks, the
midwife gives advice of various kinds. Thus a client’s remark that she wants to give
birth policlinically15 because of a water-bed at home, makes the midwife say that an
extra matrass on top of the waterbed will also be fine, or else they’ll put a bed
together in another room; another client’s complaints about extreme tiredness are
met with an examination of a drop of blood and the advice, based on the result, to
eat more spinach and dried fruit. If the woman expresses no signs of disorder, and
asks no questions,  no information of any obstetrical or medical issues is provided by
the midwife. Her clients do not get a standard echo in a nearby hospital, for ‘healthy
women do not belong in hospitals’, the midwife holds (interview).
Throughout each consultation this midwife has the habit of chatting on about
just anything, including the pregnancy, in a specific manner. Thus during the urine
check they chat about the weather, when the doppler makes audible the fetal
hearbeat she says something like: ‘that sounds fine’ and continues about the Gulf
war, and then go on about the day before when they had met in the supermarket,
measurements of the belly are noted, etc. The effect of this is that the obstetrical
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examinations hardly occur as separate activities: they are not lifted out and rendered
more special than the Gulf war or the weather. This ‘flow’ of activities renders that
which is of medical/obstetrical importance to the midwife quite ‘invisible’: it strongly
frames the pregancy as nothin special and certainly not as in need of more special
care than is already provided. Its corrolary is supposed to be a feeling of being at
ease, of no need to worry, and of complete trust put in the midwife’s ability and
capacity to notice and communicate disorder. The assumption and the performance
is that the woman and her body carry the ‘normal’, and that the midwife tries to
enforce that embodiment unless there are reasons to interrogate others. The
midwife deliberately takes care to keep as little explicated as possible what is of
obstetrical importance. It appears that in order to constitute this embodiment of
pregnancy, normality, trust and Dutch obstetrics itself, this midwife holds that what
should not be offered to a woman is explication and visibility of more than the
necessary obstetrical parameters of pregnancy. Least of all, one is to endow others
(technologies, places, professionals) with the ability to provide important and
necessary knowledge about a normal pregnancy.
The midwife does all she has to do according to the VIL, she and her client
know all they need to know. Yet when returning to our questions - how is this
obstetrical politics, and how does this politics associate (or not) the fetus with the
pregnancy? - the obstetrical politics she performs becomes clear. Although the
chatting-mode as such of this midwife may be ‘personal and subjective’, its
obstetrical performance is strong on the non-medicalization side of Dutch obstetrics.
There is no ignorance with regard to medical technologies and their work: if there
are no specific reasons, the ‘old’ range of examinations the midwife is able to
perform and with the use of which she is able to do the work of supervision and
selection according to the VIL, is sufficient.
In this modern obstetrical practice, relations exist between midwife and
woman: they constitute and partly embody the knowledge and know-how of the
pregnancy. The fetus as a third party has an intermittent and non-continuous place in
the collective in a specific and rather moderate way. It is more present than years
ago, as the midwife now listens with her doppler so that her client can also hear the
heart beat. The possibility of rendering the fetus more present, are acknowledged: if,
for example, a woman presented a family history of twins, the midwife does not
hesitate to have an ultrasound made. Important, however, is that if no such reasons
are available, the midwife does not allow the fetus - or any other third party - to
enter and modify the relations between midwief and client, client and body.16 Thus
                                                
16 Elsewhere we argue that the increasing tendency to constitute a woman’s knowledge of her
pregnancy through a variety of apparatus and people, might influence the wish or competency (of
woman and midwife) to give birth without these excorporal sources of information – at home, for
its existence is acknowledged but hardly articulated: its temporal articulations
(heartbeat, belly) appear on a par with articulations of other mundane things, such as
the weather. It does not, or hardly, become an obstetric agent through which
relations between the other participants (midwife, woman, partner) must
permanently pass.
The second Dutch practice we observed is run by two midwives who hold
consultations hours in different parts of a smal city in the south of the country. The
consultation room we saw is a gp’s office. There is a computer, a desk, a
bloodpressure meter, in an adjacent room there is a paper-sheet covered
examination table and a pair of scales. We observed the same routines here as in the
other practice: checks of urine, blood pressure, weight, measuring the belly with
hands and centimeter, the fetal heart with a doppler. All of her clients are sent to
hospital at about 12 to 16 weeks of gestation for an ultrasound: ‘they want it
anyway, so why make a fuzz’ (interview). At that same visit to the hospital, they also
have a bloodsample take for laboratory tests.
Roughly the same kind of obstetrical data are collected, but this takes place
through different kinds of articulations. This midwife hardly chats at all – again this
may be a personal characteristic, yet it colludes with the other articulations she
makes. Rather than a flow in which little stands out as an ‘events’,17 we see here
appear a series of connected yet differentiated activities which are events in
themselves and which lead to explicit obstetrical articulations. Information of
obstetrical importance is explicated by this midwife, it is put in the context and the
coherence of her work which is about getting to know this pregnancy and
explicating that knowledge to her client. Although the ultrasound itself, and the fact
that it is made in hospital are completely coherent with Dutch Obstetrics, this practice
performs that Obstetrics differently.
This midwife renders explicit what is done and what comes out, she performs
and produces obstetrical articulations: points of interest where time stands still and
part of the pregnancy is made visible for a while. A larger collective of participants
                                                                                                                                                       
example. See Pasveer, B. & Akrich, M. (1998), Hoe lichamen circuleren.     Tijdschrift voor
Genderstudies   ,     1, 3, 47-55; Pasveer, B. & Akrich, M. (forthcoming), Passages: On Coordination
Devices in Dutch and French Obstetrics. In: Vries, Ray de, et.al. (eds),      Birth By Design    .
17 See Latour, B. (1996), Trains of thoughts, Piaget, Formalism and the Fifth Dimension,      Common
Knowledge,       6, 3, 170-191, for a description of trajectories travelled with the deliberate goal of going
smoothly from a to b without any occurrance on the way standing out and lending itself as a memory,
something breaking the flow - and trajectories travelled because of the travelling and designed in
order to make events, occurrances, objects stand out as markers of the travelling. The first midwife
makes for her client a smooth obstetrical trajectory, the second articulates the travelling more
explicitly, and organizes memorable obstetrical markers.
and connections is set up here: hospital joins in for an ultrasound and a blood test,
and, as we will see shortly, the fetus too is articulated a bit differently. With the
ultrasound added, it becomes more of an entity to relate to, both for the woman and
in her relation with the midwife. At some consultations, the women had just
returned from the ultrasound, and although no images were shown, the event had
changed the experience of the pregnancy, it had added the future father as a
participant more clearly than before, the women spoke of now knowing for certain
that they were pregnant. This knowledge/experience passes through the ultrasound
which has made the fetus to enter relationships and probably reconstitute them.
Through ways of talking, performing rituals and examinations, touching
bodies, through visualizing the pregancy or not, through articulating or refraining
from doing that, particular positions with regard to institutionalized obstetrics are
taken. The first midwife articulates her position with regard to obstetrics by not
explicitly relating to her clients through obstetrical parameters – although, of course,
they constitute the only reason for her seeing these women regularly, for touching
their bodies and looking for specific kinds of information. Nothing else than
midwife/instruments and women/body enter her obstetrics. As translations and
displacements from body/client to midwife are kept to a ‘modern’ minimum, the
road back from knowledge derived from that body/client to that body/client is
short, and apparently is in no need of repair or attention.
The second midwife, who too acts in perfect accord with obstetrics as a
system, produces clear and explicit obstetrical articulations; in her practice, others
than herself and the woman have entered to produce these articulations. The fetus
has made its appearance here as a constituent of normality – in the other practice it
entered only when abnormality was suspected on clear grounds. More, and more
complicated translations are made here from body/client to midwife, they pass
through more agents, and it remains a bit unclear whether/how these translations
and mediations are fed back into the body/client.
We see that the very existence of the Dutch system of obstetrics shows that
‘modern obstetrics’ need not be solely (in)formed by the structures Arney suggests.
Its practices show, moreover, that although both midwives adhere to Obstetrics as a
macro-structure, passages from ‘micro’ to ‘macro’ differ and are not indifferent to
Obstetrics. Differences in practices are not just expressive of practitioner’s personal
and idiosynchratic ways of going about but rather organise relevant relations
between Obstetrics. They do so in non-neutral ways. The first midwife is highly
convinced of the normality of pregnancy and birth, and strongly against ‘long chains
of translation’, against contructing long trajectories with a lot of mediators. Even her
‘personal’ ways of going about – the chatmode – co-produce this politics. The second
midwife too holds the assumption of normality, but her politics tends to cohere
more with trends in Obstetrics all along, of explicating, visualizing, translating and
articulating more than before, and using some other ‘outplaced’ apparatus to
produce those articulations.
So, in modern obstetrics, in The Netherlands and elsewhere, the pregnancy, its
normality, those who constitute its parameters and their relations and articulations,
are framed in various ways. This framing takes place through the practical
techniques and technologies of surveillance/monitoring, which are at once informed
by Obstetrics and constitutive of its practices – and vice versa. Techniques and
technologies differ between countries. In France, ultrasound as well as the triple test
belong to the standard repertoire of prenatal screening, whereas in The Netherlands
the triple test does not, and ultrasounds institutes quite a range of practices. There
are similarities too: Dutch as well as French midwives and physicians ask their clients
how they feel and whether they feel their baby move. These are interrogations
which put emphasis on the fact that the woman is herself part of the ‘monitoring’.
Yet they leave undetermined the question of who is in charge of the interpretation.
As we have seen, the determination thereof is further articulated within rituals of
specific practices. Through these specific articulations, professionals propose a certain
definition of the relationships between them, the parents, the fetus/baby, and they
produce a map of different forms of knowledge and of the ways the participants
relate to each other. We have argued that such articulations are productive of
‘obstetrical politics’, or, less strongly formulated, of the ways through which
Obstetrics is a result of obstetrical practices just as much as the other way around.
Monitoring as coordination
Technologies play a central role in Arney’s analysis: they transform the way
pregnancy and birth are defined, and through objectivation they constitute an
obstetrical ‘order’, drawing upon mutual control of all participants; finally,
technologies are amongst the key factors explaining the emergence of a new
discipline, understood as both a new form of knowledge and a structure of power.
However, as our previous descriptions of prenatal surveillance have suggested, the
concept of Obstetrics as something a priori more general than obstetrical practices
and as something that can be abstracted and detached from what appear as practical
instantiations, seems to be questionable. What appears as ‘general’ can be described
as a long chain of coordination devices and techniques which are held by and hold
what they associate.
In this last section we concentrate on the French birth-configuration. We
suggest that in France, the technology of electronically monitoring fetal and uteral
activity during labour, should indeed be understood as a major device of
coordination during births in France. This specific role, which appears as an effect of
our stress upon relations rather than principles, practices rather that Obstetrics,
produces, we hope, an image of the work of technologies-at-birth that is more
complex, as well as a contribution to what we will denote in our conclusions as the
possibility of politically relevent experiments in obstetrics. As our account reveals
more and different roles for technology of monitoring than Arney’s account allows
for, it renders invisible the fact that modern obstetrics does not always pass through
the technology; therefore we ‘footnote’ our narrative with comparative remarks
about Dutch deliveries.
Let’s describe birth as it takes place in a large majority of French maternities.
When a woman arrives at the hospital or the clinic, the midwife on duty will check
manually and through a short period of electronic monitoring whether the delivery
is well underway. If so, the woman will be brought to the ‘labour room’, where she
will soon become ‘wired’. An infusion which administers glucose is installed. In case
the midwife would decide that the delivery must be accelerated or that contractions
must be regulated or enforced, it can be used to administer oxytocine, the hormone
causing the contractions. An electronic monitoring device is attached to the woman’s
belly. It comprises two separated captors: one for measuring the frequency and force
of contractions, and the other for recording fetal heartbeat. These two captors are
connected to a printer which draws two paper trails out of the succession of these
parameters. Sometimes an automatic pressure meter is added. More and more
often,18 the woman will get an epidural for pain relief/suppression.
The monitoring device performs a variety of connected activities. First of all, it
acts as a coordinator of the midwife’s activities. In larger hospitals, a midwife often
has to surveil several births simulteneously. The electronically produced paper trail
keeps a memory of the progress of labour and the baby’s situation, but it is also used
to contain additional handwritten information:  the midwife marks its temporal
dimension with notes on her interventions (internal examination, installation of
epidural, administration of oxytocine, ruptures of the waters, etc. ) and their
outcomes.
 Secondly, the monitor mediates between midwives. Midwives are on duty for
12 or 24 hours, so it occurs rather frequently that a delivery has to be surveiled by
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L’obstétrique en France, deuxième partie. Groupe d’Animation et d’Impulsion National, Caisse
Nationale d’Assurance Maladie, 145.
two different midwives. The monitoring trails, with the midwife’s notes, informs the
new midwife about specific data about the birth so far.
Thirdly, the monitoring apparatus carries and translates messages between
different kinds of professionals involved (nurses, midwives, obstetricians) , it is
productive of their specific range of activities, it is the obligatory passage point19 of
many interpretations concerning the delivery in question, and on the distribution of
responsibilities that is usually connected to such interpretations. In most public
hospitals, midwives are the only persons responsible for the surveillance of normal
births. We have argued that French perinatal care is organized around the idea that
there is no clear frontier between pathology and normalcy and that therefore any
delivery should take place in a medicalized environment in order to be prepared for
any eventuality. But this does not mean that each and every actual birth is
considered as pathological. The French organisation even produces a demarcation,
which can be modified minute per minute, between normal births surveilled by
midwives, and pathological births which imply the intervention of an obstetrician.
There are numerous reasons that legitimate an obstetrician’s intervention: the
expulsion takes too long20 and needs instrumental help, dilatation is not progressing,
fetal distress, etc. It is interesting to note that fetal distress is often diagnosed through
the analysis of the monitor-curve that represents fetal cardiac rythm. Here the
monitor plays exactly the same role as the Dutch VIL: it is the point of reference
through which professionals coordinate their activities and informations.  A (French,
Dutch) midwife knows that when she is faced with specific trails/signs, she has to call
for the obstetrician. The corrolary of Dutch VIL and French monitoring is a
distribution of responsabilities which, if not respected, can lead to professionnal and
legal sanctions. There are, of course, differences as a delivery ‘monitored’ by the VIL
leaves radically different trails and does not render visible most of the French
parameters. With the involvement of continuous electronic monitoring, control is
thus performed by the very technological device that  coordinates the work of the
different participants.
Last but not least, monitoring connects the various participants that perform
the collective action of giving birth. It is by passing through the device that the
participants acquire obstetrical importance, come to contain obstetrical parameters,
and are connected. If we try to list the ‘human’ participants to the birth
configuration, we can at least identify four of them- each of them is related to the
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monitoring device, and connections between them that are of obstetrical relevance
pass through its trails.21 The fetus is continuously present for professionals - but for
women too - through the trail of its heartbeats. In a Dutch birth, where this
continuous trail is absent as electronic monitoring is only done in cases of suspected
trouble, the fetus acquires an intermittant presence when the midwife listens to its
heartbeat a few times during labour and more often during expulsion. French
women are thus maybe reminded of their baby continuously, whereas Dutch
women are not.22
Next the uterus is present through the trail of its contractions, which are fed
with the infusion of glucose and often standardized through the administration of
oxytocin. In the French configuration - in which a large majority of women give
birth under epidural - the separation of the uterus from the woman is important. The
uterus becomes somewhat autonomous as it does not depend anymore on the
woman for energy and the supply of hormones, and the woman herself is quite
often separated from her uterus as, due to the epidural analgesia, she does not feel
much of the contractions. The only knowledge of its work is presented through the
monitoring trail to the midwife - and probably to the woman too. We will see that
only during the expulsion, this information is of importance to her. In the Dutch
configuration, the uterus is present to the midwife only as the woman reports or
shows that she is having contractions.
Third participant to the French configuration is the woman, whose body has
acquired a particular condition and whose range of competencies is related to the
work of the others - notably the monitoring apparatus. The woman is instructed as
to how to interpret the green, orange and red lights on the monitoring devise, and in
case of an orange or red light she is supposed to first modify her position in order to
allow for the good functioning of the apparatus. If the light remains red, she must
warn a medical person. She is thus actively involved into the medical surveillance,
yet the monitoring’s message to her is different from the one it sends to obstetrical
professionals, both in terms of its content and in terms of the distance it travels. It
                                                
21 See for an elaboration of this point: Pasveer, B. & Akrich, M. (1996). Hoe kinderen geboren
worden. Kennis en Methode, 20, 1, 116-145.
22 This connects with the different narratives of birth: in French journals for parents-to-be, as well
as in professional obstetrical journals, birth is proclaimed to be an event that is important for the
relations between mother and child (le lien mère-enfant); the absence of labour pain as achieved
through the epidural is said to contribute to the woman being conscious of this relationship.We
would argue that the continuous presence of the fetal heartbeat (through the paper trail and
through the sound of the machine that render the heartbeat audible) enforces this consciousness.
Dutch women do not ‘receive’ this consciousness during home-births, and the discourse of relations
between mothers-to-be and their future babies as they are constituted during deliveries is
practically absent in popular and professional journals.
therefore grants little agency, or power to interprete, to the woman, as even the
alarming ‘red’ is not, in first instance to be read as ‘something wrong with the fetus’
but as ‘change position’. The woman is supposed to be more active during the
expulsion of the baby: when under epidural, she does not sense contractions through
her body, and, importantly, felt contractions are of less obstetrical importance than
recorded contractions.23 She has to push on command of the midwife - we’ll come
back to this event shortly.
Last human participant to the normal delivery in France, is the midwife. She
comes in every 30-45mn, looks at the monitoring trail, sometimes does an internal,
checks the infusion, asks the woman if she feels all right, and writes down on the
paper trails what kind of interventions she has done. Whether under epidural or not,
the stage of labour passes without the midwife being very present to the woman.24
At the start of the expulsion, however, something interesting happens. The woman
does not register the coming, presence and duration of contractions, but the monitor
does and in accord with that, the midwife does too. At that point, the midwife warns
the woman that she must get ready for pushing - on command of monitor/midwife.
No-one can trust the woman to know how long to continue the effort of pushing
with a contraction, and her work, as well as that of her body and the activities and
the encouragements of the midwife, is coordinated by the monitor alone.25 It is the
only ‘container’ of information about the working of the uterus.
As this description reveals, the electronic monitoring device is indeed a powerful
producer of information about the birth and point of coordination between the
various participants it simultaneously contributes to individualize. Many of their
obstetrically relevant activities are informed by and connected through the
monitoring device.  Some of the participants, notably the fetus, are even produced
by the technology itself. Arney rightly argues that the parents are part of the ‘team’
as they have to give their baby the best conditions to develop. He also states that
within this team a certain division of labour appears: parents are in charge of the
psychological aspects of birth - bonding with the baby, thinking about their new
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status as parents, etc. - whereas professionals are in charge of its physiology. This
kind of division along the lines of the psychological and the physcial is not very
convincing: it remains to be seen whether and how embodiments and affections are
produced within the collective. We also think that the notion of ‘team’ has to be
taken even more seriously than Arney does and meant to do. In ‘modern obstetrics’,
a collective actor is being created through the functioning of coordination
mechanisms. In a majority of hospitals in France, monitoring and surveillance
technologies are central in performing such a collective actor in the birth process.
Conclusion
This article started with a picture in which modern obstetrics appears unified through
the existence of a regime of knowledge as well as a regime of power structured by
the monitoring concept/technology. For Arney, it is clear that a distinction has to be
made between obstetrics on one hand, and professionals’ practices and women’s
experiences on the other hand. These are either constituted as a result of Obstetrics,
or, one would think, personal and of no obstetrical importance.
In our description, we have tried to show that the performances of systems of
Obstetrics, their relations with practices and vice versa, the entities these
performances render present and related, and the ways they are connected to
experiences, is more complex. They are more complex in interesting and non-
random ways, or so we suggest. What allows participants to go from one topos to
another: from Obstetrics to practice, from practice to politics, from politics to
experience etc., is not self-evidently induced by Obstetrics, but needs to be studied as
a surprising range of passages that connect (or don’t). The monitoring device can be
seen as one of the apparatus that allow or produce such passages: it is a coordinator
of movement. Talking of passages and coordination allows one to talk about actors,
their activities, and the way they relate to one  another, without giving a priori any
privilege to any of them, without deciding a priori what is local (practice), and what
is global or general (the Concept of Obstetrics). Our description of modern
obstetrical practices also allows us to claim that there are more ways and
technologies of coordination, to interpret the existence of multiple forms of
homogeneity, defined by specific sets of coordination devices, and at the same time
to understand the existence of differences. Finally, it allows one to take into account
heterogeneous (f)actors: each form of coordination can have its own genesis, its own
history, its own way of mixing trails, rather than, as Arney suggests, being the result
of some grand and unique cause (Obstetrics).
But our analysis might also allow for more political conclusions or suggestions
– it is not a theoretical excercise only. Single causes with single effects allow for little
space for manoeuvre: as long as the cause (the concept of obstetrics, the definition of
birth as pathological or physiological) remains present, little else can be done to
affect the practices of obstetrics. If one insists that the heterogenity and the variety of
elements is always in similar ways associated by coordination devices, then
deliberate transformations and evolutions seem rather difficult. If, on the other hand,
one insists on the ‘locality’ of causes (be they ‘big’ and produced as it were ‘from
above’, or small and produced every instance anew in obstetric consultations), on the
fact that there is not one single and monolythic logic explaining the functioning of all
of obstetrics, then there appears is room for significant and politically relevant
initiative, for negotiation, for experiment, for diversity within and amongst practices.
Seen in that light, Arney’s description of obstetrics might thus be interpreted
as just one trend amongst others,  in which professionals’ attitudes also perform a
positioning in a space of possibilities. Thus, describing practices in both countries in
terms of ‘national’ differences only has little sense, since we have seen practice can
vary a lot too within a single country. What remains different is the way these
various practices can be interpreted as political statements with regard to the
“general” policies of obstetrics which are themselves defined by legal constraints and
institutionalized forms of coordination.
If the ways obstetrical practices perform the work of coordination in various
non-random yet unsystematic ways, as we have argued, these differences should be
treated as relevant rather than idiosynchratic. If they produce importantly different
ways of allocating powers to be in charge of interpretations, of experiencing health,
‘life’, disorders, they might be worth studying further and more thoroughly. For it
might be here that creative combinations of medical machines and human bodies
could be installed, that new passages to go from practice to organisation can be
devised, for none of these has its own, essential and fixed characteristics. Rather than
having to be ‘against’ or ‘for’ prenatal or antenatal technologies, one might want
consider specific practices of surveillance as the sites of interesting experiments
directed at new definitions of Obstetrics: of pregnancy, birth, safety and risk, power
and experience. And so, by having made relevant much of what tends to be
interpreted as random and subjective variance, our analysis too is meant to be
political: we deliberately wish to encourage experiments and variation.
